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Case No. 20100049-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
CRAIG VEALE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant was charged with murder, but convicted of the lesser-included 
offense of reckless manslaughter, a second-degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (West Supp. 2010). He now appeals that conviction. This 
Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does the evidence support the jury's finding that Defendant was 
reckless when, during an argument, he pointed and fired a loaded shotgun at 
his girlfriend who was only a few feet away? 
Standard of Review, Reversal of a jury verdict is warranted only if " after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the . . . verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inherently improbable . . . that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she < 
was convicted/' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation and 
internal marks omitted). Here, the merits should not be considered, because 
Defendant failed to preserve the issue and affirmatively sought a manslaughter 
instruction. See id. at f 11 & 16. The merits should also not be considered, 
• • • • 1 
because Defendant fails to marshal the evidence that supports the jury verdict. 
See United Park City Mines Co. v, Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, If If • 
26-27,140 P.3d 1200. 
2. Has Defendant established that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
choosing not to object to the medical examiner's testimony describing the i 
victim's injuries or the examiner's use of a Styrofoam head to illustrate that 
testimony? 
Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 
.f 6, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Walker, 2010 UT App 157, t 13, 235 P.3d 766. To 
establish ineffectiveness, Defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's 
decision not to object "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and 
"actually had an adverse effect on the defense." State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, \ \ 34 & 
40, 247 P.3d 344 (citations and internal marks omitted). The merits should not 
-2-
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be considered, because Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting his 
counsel's decision. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f^| 26-27. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative provisions are attached to Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2403 (West Supp. 2010) - Definitions; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (West 2009) - Voluntary Intoxication; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (West Supp. 2010) - Manslaughter; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206 (West Supns 2010) - Negligent Homicide.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In December 2002, Defendant was charged with first-degree murder (Rl-
3). The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed to represent 
Defendant and they requested full discovery (R13-16). In the course of that 
discovery, they received copies of 25 color photographs of the deceased victim 
and crime scene and notice that the state medical examiner, Dr. Fricke, would 
"testify as to the victim's injuries and cause of death" (R8 & 27). 
Defense counsel moved in limine to exclude " introduction of photographs 
of the decedent's wounds on the grounds that they are gruesome in nature .. . 
and that the information can be described by the testifying lay and expert 
witnesses" (R42). See also Add. C (Motion & Memorandum). Counsel asserted that 
1
 Defendant committed his crime in 2002 and was tried in 2003. For 
convenience, the State cites to the current version of statutes, which for purposes 
of this case have not substantively changed. 
-3-
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the photographs were presumptively inadmissible and, therefore, the 
prosecution was required to prove that they had "unusual probative value" to < 
admit them (R46). Defense counsel claimed that, here, the prosecution could not 
meet this burden, because "all of the information which could conceivably be 
adduced from the photos can be established by uncontradicted lay and medical 
testimony .. . [and] none of the information contained in the photos is disputed 
• ' i 
by the defendant in this case" (R47). The appellate record does not contain a 
ruling on the motion; but at trial, the prosecution did not introduce photographs 
of the victim's injuries. See Exhibits 2-6 (depicting crime scene, but not victim's 
injuries). Instead, the state medical examiner used a Styrofoam head to facilitate 
her description of the victim's injuries and their significance in determining the ! 
positions of the defendant, the victim, and the gun when Defendant fired the 
fatal shot (R178:177-184). See also Add. D: Photograph of Exhibit 15 (Shjrofoam 
Head). A police officer, who responded to the scene, also described what he saw, 
including the victim's injuries (Rl78:120-128). 
A two-day jury trial was held in June 2003 (R51-52). At the end of the 
prosecution's case-in-chief, Defendant moved to dismiss the murder charge, 
because he claimed that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove an 
intentional killing (R178:186). But Defendant conceded that the evidence 
supported that he recklessly used the firearm and moved the court to "change 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this [murder charge] into a manslaughter" in submitting the case to the jury (id.). 
The court refused to dismiss the murder charge; but at Defendant's request, 
subsequently allowed the jury to consider two lesser alternatives: reckless 
manslaughter and negligent homicide (Rl78:186-187; R179:73). See also Add. B 
(Murder, Manslaughter, & Negligent Homicide Jury Instructions). The jury 
acquitted Defendant of murder and convicted him of manslaughter (R85; 
R179:21). Defendant did not move to arrest the manslaughter verdict. 
In August 2003, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the statutory term 
of 1-15 years imprisonment (R94-95).2 No appeal was filed. In 2009, Defendant 
moved to be resentenced nunc pro tunc (R130). The court granted the motion 
and reinstated the time period for Defendant to appeal his conviction (R156). 
Defendant then timely appealed (Rl58). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Sometime early in the morning on December 28,2002, Defendant picked 
up a loaded shotgun during an argument with his girlfriend. He pointed the 
gun at her, as she stood only a few feet away, and pulled the trigger. The 
shotgun blast blew off the bottom-of her face and killed her. The State claimed 
2
 The signed judgment is not in the pleadings file, but in a separate 
envelope marked "private." 
J
 Consistent with appellate standards/the facts are stated in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, | 78,100 P.3d 1177. 
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the shooting was intentional and charged Defendant with murder. The jury 
found that it was reckless and convicted him of manslaughter. Defendant < 
claims that he acted only with criminal negligence and is, therefore, guilty only 
of negligent homicide. See Br.Aplt. at 29 n.l . 
* * * 
Loretta Romero and Defendant had lived together for 13 years, but by 
1 
December 2002, their relationship "wasn' t . . .very good" (R178:68; R179:52). For 
months, they had been "going through some really, really, really bad times" 
(R178:108). Loretta "was making steps to get out" of the relationship and to 
return home to her family (Rl 78:68). 
For about six months, Loretta had been going to bars with her friends to < 
play darts — usually at least three times a week (Rl78:67; Rl79:50). She rarely 
invited Defendant to come with her (Rl79:50). This created some friction 
between them (R179: 57-58 & 133). 
On the evening of December 27, Loretta told Defendant she did not want 
him to come with her to the bar (R179:51). She also told him not to remain at 
their apartment that weekend, but to stay with one of his friends (id.). She then 
left. She stayed at the bar for hours playing darts. She even danced, which was 
unusual and made her "very smiley, very happy" (R178:70). She left the bar 
sometime after 12:30 a.m. and before 1:50 a.m. (R178:69-70; R178:73). When she 
-6-
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got back to her apartment, however, she discovered that Defendant was still 
there (R179:33-34). 
Defendant was unemployed and depressed (R178:108; Rl79:25). For the 
last several months, he had been drinking frequently and heavily — as many as 
30 beers a day - and December 27 was no different (Rl79:10-11,25, & 47-48). He 
began drinking beer that morning at around 9:00 a.m. and continued to drink off 
and on for the rest of day (R179: 20, 25-26, & 33). When Loretta returned from 
work that evening, he hoped she would stay home, but, as had become her 
habit, she left (R179:25). 
After she left, Defendant thought about killing himself (R178:130; R179:54-
56). Around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., he got his shotgun —a Maverick Model 88 12-
gauge shotgun — out of the bedroom closet (Rl79:26). The gun was always kept 
fully loaded with the safety off (Rl 79:28-29). Defendant liked to store the gun 
this way so that he could fire it quickly if he needed to (id.). Defendant felt that 
he knew how to handle the shotgun: he had owned it for two years, had hunted 
with it, and had taught friends how to fire it (R178:138; R179:28). He knew that 
if the shotgun were fired at a person, it was "perfectly capable of killing" the 
person (R179:45-46). In fact, he kept the gun loaded with "four-buck" 
ammunition that, when fired, had a "much more dramatic" effect because each 
shell contained 40 pieces of metal shot (R178128 & 139). 
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After he retrieved the gun, Defendant "pumped" it, which moved one of 
the six rounds in the gun's magazine into the gun's firing chamber (Rl78:122 & ( 
160; Rl79:30). Defendant knew that if he now pulled the trigger, the chambered 
round would fire unless—before he pulled the trigger—he ejected the 
chambered round or activated the gun's safety latch (R178:145-150; R179:18, 28-
29,39-40 & 45-46). Defendant left the gun in this ready-fire condition, sat in his 
i 
bathtub, and pointed the gun's muzzle at himself (Rl79:30). He stayed in that 
position for about 20 minutes, thinking "good and hard" about whether he 
would pull the trigger and kill himself (id.). But after thinking about "the people 
[he] would leave behind," he " decided not to pull the trigger" and got out of the 
bathtub (Rl79:55). Still holding the gun, he sat in a living room chair and 
telephoned a friend to "cheer" himself up (Rl79:30-31). 
Defendant felt better after the telephone call, but did not put his shotgun 
away (R179:33). Instead, he leaned the gun against the bedroom door jam 
(R179:31). He did not eject the live round from the gun's chamber, engage its 
safety device, or otherwise unload it (R179:31-32 & 64). Rather, he sat in the 
living room chair, drank a few more beers, and waited for Loretta to come home 
(Rl79:33 & 57). Defendant fell asleep in the chair, but woke up when Loretta 
opened the front door (R179:33-34). 
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Defendant demanded to know why Loretta was so late (Rl78:131; 
R179:34, 57, & 64). She responded, 'Tuck you" (R178:108). He said, "No, fuck 
you" (id.). Defendant continued to ask where she had been for so long. She told 
him it was "none of [his] business" and walked into the bedroom to undress 
(R178:137: R179:34). As she did, he could hear her throwing things around 
(R178:131). She then walked into the bathroom just off the small hall next to the 
bedroom (R179:36 & 58). See Add. D; Photograph ofExh. 1 (Apartment Diagram). 
She stood in front to the mirror over the vanity and began removing her 
makeup (Rl79:35). 
Defendant got up from the chair, walked a few steps to the bedroom door, 
and "grabbed" his shotgun (R179:36-37). Holding the shotgun, he walked to 
where Loretta was standing, grabbed her shoulder, and pulled her around to 
face him (R178137-138). In the process, he pulled her bra strap with enough 
force to leave a bruise and abrasion on her shoulder (Rl78:137-139 & 173-174). 
Loretta saw the gun and demanded to know, " [W]hat the fuck are you going to 
do about it?" or "What the fuck are you going to do with that?"(Rl78:109,132, 
137; R179:38, 61-62, & 64). Defendant did not respond but stepped back a bit 
into the hall, placed the gun on his hip, pointed it up towards Loretta's head, 
and pulled the trigger (R178:137 & 181). 
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The blast hit Loretta dead-on in the mouth and blew off her lower face 
(Rl78:57,125426,135,169, 175, & 178). See also Add. D: Exh. 15. Blood and 
tissue splattered over the bathroom and hallway as she fell backwards (Rl78:96, 
124, 169470, & 172-76). Based on Loretta's injuries and the blood and tissue 
splattering, the medical examiner concluded that Defendant and Loretta were 
standing and facing each other when he shot her (R179424 & 170471).4 The 
medical examiner also concluded that when Defendant fired the gun, he was 
holding it at his hip, with the 20-inch barrel pointed up towards Loretta (R178: 
180-81). See also R152453 (officer demonstrating how defendant said he was 
holding gun). The muzzle was only two to four feet away from her — "fairly 
close range for a shotgun" (R178:180481). Loretta died almost instantly 
(R178:170471). 
Defendant ejected the fired shell by pushing the eject button, pumped the 
gun to chamber another round, but did not fire it again (R178:90-91,96,99,126-
127,142, & 149-150). Defendant"contemplate[ed] whether to kill himself or to 
call 911" (R178135). He "figured he had done bad enough" and walked into the 
living room and leaned the gun against the couch (Rl78:87 &135). At 1:50 a.m., 
he called 911 emergency (Rl78:73). 
4
 The medical examiner could not establish their precise locations, but 
their relative positions and proximity to each other (R178470472 & 180-183). 
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During the 911 call, the realization of what Defendant had done fully hit 
him. Defendant was distraught and crying and repeatedly told the dispatcher, 
"Oh my God I just, I just killed my girlfriend" (Exh. 9: Transcript of 911 Call). See 
also Exh. 8 (Tape of 911 Call). He exclaimed, "I shot her with my shotgun. . . . 
How stupid am I? . . . Point blank, she's dead" (Exh. 9 at 1). He told the 
dispatcher that Loretta "just barely came home, she's, she's been and, and she 
just came home and she was, she's like fuck you where did you, what what are 
you gonna do . . . " (id. at 2). He said he had put "special bullets" in the gun that 
night to shoot himself, "but she came home, she came home (inaudible) . . . and 
she says, 'What are you gonna do, what are you gonna do, what, what are you 
gonna do to me'?" (id. at 3). The dispatcher asked if the shooting was accidental 
and Defendant replied, "Yeah. . . she just barely came home, she'd been out for 
hours" and repeated that he could not "believe that [he] just killed her" (id. at 5). 
After a few minutes, the dispatcher directed Defendant to go outside, 
where officers were waiting to arrest him. Defendant followed her directions 
(Exh. 9). He also complied with the commands of the arresting officers, 
including their orders to put down his cell phone, to keep his hands in the air, to 
walk from the apartment, to lay on the ground, to get up from the ground, and 
to get into the patrol car (R178:82-86 & 105). 
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Over the next several hours, Defendant spoke to the police about what 
had happened. In the patrol car, he volunteered that he had committed / ' the 
worst sin against God" (Rl78:109). In the jail holding cell, he called himself "a 
monster" (R178:110). And when a detective interviewed him around 6:00 a.m., 
Defendant explained three times what had occurred (Rl 78:100-129,153, & 156; 
R179:43, 65, & 71). He told the detective that he "could not justify his actions 
and what he did" and "at one poin t . . . [said] it was the worst mistake that he'll 
ever make" (R178:141). Defendant also said he would not characterize what he 
did as "domestic violence," but as "drunken stupidity" (id.). But, at no point did 
Defendant claim that he was attempting to unload the shotgun when it 
discharged (Rl79:64 & 70). 
Rather, Defendant made this claim for the first time at trial. Defendant 
testified that at some point in their argument Loretta saw the shotgun and told 
him to put it away (R179:35). "As far [Defendant] can remember," the only 
reason he picked up the gun was to remove the live round from the chamber 
(R179:59-60). See also R179:36 ("I think I remembered that I had a r o u n d 
chambered, I can't remember, but there's a little button on it that I could push 
and the slide will come down. And I thing that I was trying to get that"). He 
admitted that he intentionally pointed the gun towards the bathroom mirror, 
but claimed that he needed the light from the bathroom and thought Loretta 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was standing towards the other end of the mirror (Rl 79:59). He admitted that 
just before the gun fired, Loretta demanded to know what he was going to do 
(Rl79:38). Yet, he claimed that in the next moment, when the gun fired, he did 
not see her, because he was looking down at the gun (R179:59-61). He also 
asserted that because he was "drunk/ ' he was not "paying attention" to where 
Loretta was standing (R179:61). But he admitted that he knew she was in the 
bathroom and standing, at best, at the other end of the mirror within a couple of 
feet from where he was aiming (Rl79:38, 41, & 59). See Exhs. 3 & 4 (depicting 
bathroom mirror). 
Defendant surmised that in attempting to push the eject button, he must 
have "hit" the trigger (R179:36-38 & 60). He claimed that, at that moment, 
Loretta must have "peek[ed] around the corner [of the bathroom wan I . . . to 
make sure that [he] was putting [the gun] away" and got hit (Rl79:59-61). 
Although Defendant characterized his carelessness as "drunken 
stupidity" to the detective (R178:141), he never claimed that his intoxication 
prevented him from knowing what he was doing. To the contrary, he could 
describe every detail of the evening—but for pulling the trigger (Rl 79:130-132, 
134-135, 137-138; R179:19-26, 30-38, 57-62, & 64-65). Likewise, those who 
interacted with Defendant that night —including his friend and various 
officers — detected that he had been drinking, but did not think he was drunk: he 
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had no problem in walking and conversing normally and responded 
appropriately to all questions and commands (Rl78:82-85,105,114-117, & 154). < 
A blood-alcohol test administered at 7:50 a.m. registered at 0.15 (R178:54-57). 
But Defendant admitted that he typically —even daily —consumed the same 
amount of alcohol as he had on December 27 (R178:163; R179:47-48).5 
Defendant's claim that the gun accidentally discharged during unloading 
• < 
was inconsistent with the physical evidence. The trigger— which was smooth 
and round and centered under the gun—was not a "hair-trigger," but required a 
full pull force of nearly 6 pounds to fire the gun (Rl78:145-146 & 151-152). See 
Exh. 2). The eject button, on the other hand, was on the side of the gun (Rl79:39-
40). Once a round was chambered,"the gun is ready to operate, ready to fire as 
long as the safety device is not engaged. When [a] red light is showing on the 
safety, the gun is ready to fire and pulling the trigger will fire the gun. When 
the safety is engaged, there's no red mark on the safety and the gun will not fire. 
The trigger will not pull" (R178:149). Defendant's shotgun was tested to see if it 
would fire when loaded without exerting full force on the trigger (Rl78:145-152). 
The gun was "bang[ed] . . . from different directions, slam[ed] . . .on its side, 
5
 On cross-examination, the investigating detective agreed that, if 
Defendant had nothing to drink after midnight—as he claimed —his blood-
alcohol level was likely higher at the time of the crime (Rl78:156-157). But 
Defendant was not asked if he drank after Loretta got home or if he drank after 
he killed her and before he called 911. 
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[and] slam[ed] from behind/7 but would not fire (R178:145). No matter what 
was done to the shogun, it simply would not fire "without actually pulling the 
trigger" with a full pull force (R178:145 & 151-152). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sufficiency of Evidence. Defendant claims that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support manslaughter, because it does not establish "for sure" 
that he perceived the risk of death that his actions created. 
This Court should not consider the merits of this claim, however, because 
Defendant to preserve the claim and invited any error. In the trial court, 
Defendant conceded that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a 
reckless finding and asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge 
of manslaughter. Having thus admitted that a reasonable jury could find him 
guilty of manslaughter, he cannot now claim the opposite. The Court should 
also refuse to consider the merits of the claim, because Defendant fails to 
marshal the evidence that supports the manslaughter verdict. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, Defendant's testimony and 
admissions alone support the verdict. Defendant admitted that he always kept 
the shotgun fully loaded with its safety off. He admitted that a few hours before 
he killed Loretta, he had chambered a live round. He admitted that he was 
trying to unload the gun when it fired and conceded that the gun fired only 
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because he must have pulled the trigger. He admitted that he knew that if the 
gun were fired while pointed at a person, death was likely. And, he admitted < 
that when the gun was fired, it was pointing in Loretta's direction and, at best, 
she was only a mirror-length away from where he was aiming. 
In addition, the physical evidence fully supported the jury's recklessness 
finding. The evidence established that when Defendant fired the shotgun, the 
victim and he were actually only a few feet apart and facing each other. The 
evidence further established that Defendant was pointing the shotgun directly at 
Loretta's head, which was only two to four feet from the muzzle. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant claims for the first time on 
appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the 
medical examiner's description of the victim's injuries or to her use of a 
Styrofoam head to illustrate that testimony. The merits should not be 
considered, because Defendant fails to marshal the evidence that supports the 
reasonableness of his counsel's actions. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, Defendant fails to establish that 
his counsel was ineffective. Defense counsel strategically chose not to object to 
the medical examiner's testimony, because that testimony helped to preclude 
the admission of more graphic or "gruesome" photographs of the victim's 
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injuries. Utah precedent supports counsel's decision. Moreover, any objection 
to the medical examiner's testimony would have been futile. 
Defendant was charged with murder, which put his intent at issue. The 
State, therefore, had the right to explain how the crime occurred to prove that 
intent. This, in turn, required analysis of the victim's injuries and blood and 
tissue splattering at the scene. And although Defendant now claims that he 
would have stipulated to these facts, the State was entitled not to accept the 
stipulation and to fully explain why the medical examiner reached the 
conclusion that she did. The examiner's use of a Styrofoam head to illustrate her 
testimony was also permissible, because it avoided the introduction of more 
graphic or gruesome photographs of the injuries to explain that testimony. 
But even assuming that Defendant established deficient performance, he 
cannot show prejudice. In addition to the medical examiner's description of the 
victim's injuries and the blood and tissue splattering, the officer who responded 
to the scene also testified to what he saw. Because Defendant does not challenge 
the admission of the officer's testimony on appeal, he cannot establish prejudice 
from the medical examiner's similar testimony. The record also does not support 
the claim that the examiner's testimony unfairly inflamed the jury where the 
jury acquitted Defendant of the greater crime of murder. Nor does Defendant 
explain how sanitizing the medical examiner's testimony or excluding the 
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Styrofoam head would have changed the jury's manslaughter verdict. He 
concedes that even if the medical examiner's testimony had been sanitized, the 
examiner could still have testified that Defendant and Loretta were facing each 
other and only a few feet apart when Defendant pointed the gun at Loretta's 
head and fired. Once this evidence was introduced, a finding of at least 
recklessness was inevitable. Consequently, because Defendant has not 
established a reasonable probability of a different outcome, his ineffectiveness 
claim necessarily fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I . • , 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT RECKLESSLY KILLED HIS 
GIRLFRIEND BY FIRING A LOADED SHOTGUN AT HER 
FROM A FEW FEET AWAY 
Defendant claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
jury's finding of recklessness and, consequently, the manslaughter verdict. See 
Br.Aplt at 21-29. Defendant, however, failed to preserve this issue and invited 
any error by conceding below that the evidence was legally sufficient to support 
reckless manslaughter. Additionally, he fails to marshal the evidence that 
supports the jury verdict. Consequently, this Court should not consider the 
merits of the claim. Alternatively, the evidence amply supports the verdict. 
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A. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant failed 
to preserve a sufficiency claim and invited the error he now 
claims. 
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting his manslaughter conviction. Because Defendant did not 
preserve this issue and actively sought inclusion of a manslaughter instruction, 
he invited any error. This Court, therefore, should not consider the claim's 
merits. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal/' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citation 
omitted). 
The preservation rule serves two important policies. First, "in the 
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
it. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989). Second, a 
defendant should not be permitted to forego an objection with the 
strategy of "enhance[ing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and 
then, if the strategy fails,. . . claim[ing] on appeal that the Court 
should reverse." "state v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155/l59 (Utah 1989). 
Id. at Tf 11 (ellipses in original). "[T]he preservation rule applies to every claim, 
.. .unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
'plain error'occurred." Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant failed to preserve his sufficiency claim, because he failed 
to move to arrest the manslaughter verdict. See id. at ^ 14 & 16 (recognizing 
that motion to arrest judgment is generally necessary to preserve sufficiency 
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claim). And he does not now argue that exceptional circumstances or plain 
error should excuse this default. See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, f 21,167 P.3d 
1046 (refusing to address merits of unpreserved claim where Defendant 
''declined to present an argument to support the application of either exception'7 
to preservation rule). Rather, he simply ignores the preservation rule. See 
Br.Aplt. at 1-2 & 21-29 (making no reference to preservation). 
Even more egregiously, he does not acknowledge that he invited the very 
error he now claims. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) 
(reaffirming well-established rule that "a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at the trial court when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error"); State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, H 9-10,236 P.3d 155 
(recognizing that" [affirmative representations that a party has no objection to 
the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such 
representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without 
further consideration of the issues" ) (citation and internal marks omitted), cert, 
denied, 247 P.3d 774 (Utah 2011). 
At the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief, Defendant moved to dismiss 
the murder charge, because he claimed that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish an intentional killing. See Statement of the Case at 4-5. At the same time, 
he conceded that the State's evidence was legally sufficient to establish that he 
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acted recklessly and asked the trial court to charge the jury with the "lesser 
include offense of manslaughter" (R178:187). Id. He later requested that the 
jury also be charged with a second alternative of negligent homicide, which 
theory he ultimately argued to the jury (R179:73). Thus, while Defendant 
argued to the jury that they should find that he was criminally negligent, he 
conceded to the trial court that the jury could legally find that he was reckless. 
Cf. State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 35-36 (Utah App. 1996) (recognizing that 
charge properly submitted to jury when "some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of. the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
In sum, having conceded that a reasonable jury could legally find him 
guilty .of manslaughter, Defendant may not now claim that no evidence 
supports the manslaughter verdict. 
B. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to 
marshal the evidence that supports the jury's verdict. 
In addition to the preservation requirement, Defendant is. also obligated 
to marshal the evidence that supports the jury verdict before he may claim that 
no evidence supports it. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(9)(a) (requiring appellants to 
"marshal all record evidence that supports" a challenged finding or fact-
dependent ruling). 
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Proper marshaling requires defendant to do more than provide "a general 
catalogue of evidence/' West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, < 
1315 (Utah App. 1991). He must instead "present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
 ( 
supports the very findings [Defendant] resists." Id. (emphasis in original). In 
doing so, Defendant must embrace the position that he opposes: 
[Appellants] are required to temporarily remove their own 
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position; they must 
play the devil's advocate. {A]ppellants must. . , not attempt to 
construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case . . . [and , 
must not] merely re-argue the factual case presented to the trial 
court. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Ponds, 2006 UT 35, \ 2<b, 140 
P.3d 1200 (citations and internal marks omitted). If Defendant fails to "perform 
this critical task, [the appellate court] can rely on that failure to affirm" the lower 
court. Id. at \ 27. Here, Defendant fails to fulfill this critical task. 
For example, Defendant contends "[t]here is no evidence . . . that shows 
that [he] was aware of the risk he was taking while handling the gun." Br.Aplt. 
at 27 & 29. Defendant's own testimony, however, contradicts that assertion: 
Defendant: So I grabbed the gun, and I think I remembered that I 
had a round chambered, I can't remember, but there's a button on 
it that I could push and the slide will come down. And I think that 
I was trying to get that And I remember trying to get the slide 
to come down. And the gun went off. 
(R179:36 & 37). 
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(R179:36&37). 
Defendant Just before—just before [the gun] went off, [Loretta] 
had asked me — she said, "What are you going to do with that?" . . . 
I was trying to pull the pump down on it to open the chamber up. 
Just to make sure that it was safe. . . . The trigger, there's a little 
button that you can push for the slid to come down and the safety 
are all right there together. And I must have hit the trigger. 
(R179:38). 
Defendant. I was trying to unload the gun and it went off. 
(Rl 79:41). After Defendant testified that he only picked up the shotgun to put it 
away, the following exchange occurred: 
Prosecutor: Because you're going to unload it? 
Defendant Yes. Well, I'm going to put it away. 
Prosecutor: But first you're going to get the round out of the 
chamber? 
Defendant As far as I can remember, yes. 
(Rl79:59). Defendant then explained what happened the moment before he 
pulled the trigger: 
Defendant [Loretta] must have been peeking around the corner [of 
the bathroom wall] or something just to make sure that I was 
putting it away because I know she could hear me messing with 
the slide on it. . . . She saw me with the gun. I hadn't started 
unloading it yet. 
(R179:60&61). 
Defendant also asserts that there is no evidence that contradicts his claim 
that he was unloading the gun when it fired. See Br.Avlt. at 24. The marshaled 
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evidence establishes, however, that Defendant did not make this claim when 
arrested, but only at trial Indeed, despite numerous opportunities to explain 
his actions the night he was arrested, he provided no explanation of why he 
fired the gun other than " drunken stupidity/7 See Statement of Facts at 11-12. 
Defendant claims that there is no evidence that he perceived the risk that 
Loretta might be hit or killed, when he intentionally pointed the gun in her 
direction. See Br.Aplt. at 24. But the physical evidence established that the two 
were facing each other and only a few feet apart when Defendant fired. See 
Statement of Facts at 10. Indeed, even Defendant admitted that he was aiming 
the gun at the bathroom mirror —supposedly because he needed more light— 
and knew that Loretta was, at best, only a couple of feet away at the other end of 
the mirror. See id. at 12-13 & Exhs. 3-4. See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 21 ("It is 
well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence/7) (citation 
and internal marks omitted); State v. Watkins, 2011 UT App 96, % 17, 678 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 25 ("Intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the 
person's conduct viewed in the light of all the accompanying circumstances/') 
(citation and internal marks omitted). 
Given Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence that supports the jury's 
reckless manslaughter verdict, this Court should not consider the merits of his 
sufficiency claim. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, j^ 27. 
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C. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the evidence supports 
the verdict. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, ample evidence supports the 
jury's determination that Defendant acted recklessly and thereby committed 
manslaughter. 
As applied here, manslaughter requires that the actor "recklessly cause 
the death of another/' See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205(1)(a) (West Supp. 2010). 
A person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk the circumstances exist or the result will occur/' 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(3) (WestSupp. 2010) (emphasis added). Negligent 
homicide, on the other hand, is established when "the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-206(1) (West 
Supp. 2010). A person is "criminally negligent. . . when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(4) (emphasis added). 
In either case, " [t]he risk must be of a nature and degree that its disregard 
[or the failure to perceive it] constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(3) & (4). Thus, 
"[tjhe risk of death required for recklessness and for criminally negligent 
conduct is the same; the only difference between the two is whether the 
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defendant was aware of that risk." State v. Boss, 2005 UT App 520, Tj 14, n. 2,127 
P.3d 1236 (citations omitted). < 
[I]n the case of manslaughter, the person perceives the risk of death 
and ignores it, while in the case of negligent homicide, the person 
does not perceive the risk, but should.
 ( 
State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,206 (UT App 1992) (citing State v. Standifbrd, 769 
P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988). 
[T]he difference generally lies in making a judgment as to where on 
a continuum of unreasonable conduct ones behavior passes from 
negligence to recklessness. In essence it is a matter of judging 
when conduct is no longer just gray but dark gray. Such 
judgments are for juries to make[.] . . . It is the jury, after all, that 
brings a collective experience and judgment that no judge can 
duplicate in making judgments based on everyday experiences. 
Boggess v. State, 655 P.2d 654, 658 (Utah 1982) (affirming manslaughter 
conviction where defendant thinking gun was unloaded, pointed it at wife and 
fired). 
Here, Defendant concedes that he "should have been aware of the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death. See Br.Aplt. at 29 n.l. He also 
concedes that, at minimum, he was criminally negligent and guilty of criminal 
homicide. See id. The only issue then is whether the evidence supports the 
jury's finding that he subjectively perceived the risk and was therefore guilty of 
manslaughter. 
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Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's 
finding for two reasons. First, he claims that the evidence does not establish that 
he knew "for sure" the gun was loaded. See Br.Aplt. at 25-26. Second, he 
suggests that his voluntary intoxication prevented him from perceiving the risk. 
See id. at 28. Both claims lack merit. 
1. The evidence supports the jury's determination that 
Defendant perceived the risk created of pointing a loaded 
shotgun at a person. 
Defendant asserts that the State must prove that he knew "for sure" the 
gun was ready to fire when he pointed it at Loretta. See Br.Aplt. at 25, 27, & 29. 
Utah does not require this for reckless manslaughter. Rather, the evidence need 
only establish that Defendant was aware that the shotgun might be loaded. 
In affirming a manslaughter conviction based on similar, but less 
egregious, facts, the Utah Supreme Court explained that a defendant's belief that 
a gun is unloaded does not diminish his recklessness in pointing a gun that 
might be loaded: 
The defendant did not claim that he was unaware of the danger 
associated with the use of guns. He admitted that he should have 
looked to have seen if the gun was unloaded before he fired it, but 
he did not. . . . Even though he thought the gun was unloaded, 
defendant knew it was dangerous to have pointed it at his wife and 
pulled the trigger. In view of this evidence as to the defendant's 
knowledge concerning the inherent danger of firearms and the 
recklessness of his conduct towards his wife, the evidence would 
not admit of a finding that he was unaware but should have been 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, or that he failed to 
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< 
perceived the nature and degree of the risk - all of which is 
necessary to constitute criminal negligence. To the contrary, the 
defendant's own testimony establishes a state of mind found in 
manslaughter/7 
Boggess, 655 P.2d at 654-55. This Court has likewise recognized that 
manslaughter does not require a "for sure" showing: 
Past [Utah] law suggests that if one purposely aims a gun at a 
person or at a location where people are likely to be and the gun 
discharges, courts are willing to infer that the actor was aware of a 
risk and was, therefore, reckless However, in cases . . . in which 
it is undisputed that the aiming was inadvertent, such an inference 
does not follow. 
State v. Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, ^ 10 n.3, 63 P.3d 105 (refusing to bind over on 
manslaughter charge where undisputed evidence established defendant never 
intentionally chambered round and made every effort to ensure gun was safe, 
including removing clip, but gun discharged and hit person that gun was only 
accidentally aimed at). 
In this case, Defendant never testified that he thought the shotgun was 
unloaded. To the contrary, he admitted that he always kept the gun fully 
loaded with the safety off. See Statement of Facts at 7. He hedged only on 
whether he "remembered"' that he had "chambered" a round, meaning that he 
had "pumped" the gun and moved one of the six rounds in it from the 
magazine and into the firing chamber. See id. at 12-13. Yet, Defendant admitted 
that he had chambered this round a few hours earlier when he considered 
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suicide. See id. at 8. And he insisted that later when he picked up the gun in the 
middle of his argument with Loretta, he did so only to eject this round and 
make the gun "safe" before he put it away (R179: 36,38, 41, & 59). 
Moreover, Defendant's comparison of this case to Robinson is of no avail. 
See Br.Aplt. at 22-28. Robinson only inadvertently aimed his gun at or near his 
victim. See Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, Tf 10 n.3. Defendant here admitted that he 
deliberately aimed his gun towards the bathroom mirror and within feet of 
Loretta (Rl79:59). The physical evidence supported an even more intentional 
aiming. Defendant directly faced Loretta and pointed the gun towards her head 
when he fired. See Statement of Tacts atlO. 
Given the physical evidence and Defendant's own testimony and 
admissions, the jury reasonably found that he perceived the risk he created in 
pointing the gun at Loretta. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 21; Watkins, 2011 UT App 
96, f^ 17 (both recognizing that intent may be inferred from conduct and 
circumstances). 
2. The evidence supports the jury's finding that voluntary 
intoxication did not prevent Defendant from perceiving the 
risk. 
Defendant also suggests that intoxication preventing him from perceiving 
the risk, thus, negating recklessness. See Br.Aplt. at 26-27. 
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Defendant does not acknowledge that voluntary intoxication has only 
limited application in a case involving reckless or criminally negligent conduct: < 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge 
unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or 
criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his 
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (West 2009) (Add. A). "Under the Utah Criminal
 ( 
Code, voluntary intoxication doesn't absolve a defendant of criminal 
responsibility for reckless criminal acts/7 State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 
1985). "Although intoxication may be a partial defense to a specific intent crime, 
it is not a defense to a crime requiring a mens rea of recklessness/' State v. 
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257,260 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). Even if "a defendant is 
unaware of the serious risks he has created for the safety of others because of 
intoxication, the law holds the person responsible for having voluntarily and 
knowingly placed himself in that position/7 Id. at 260. 
Voluntary intoxication may be considered, however, in determining a 
defendant's perception of the risk. 
[T]he degree of intoxication may bear upon whether a defendant 
was reckless or criminally negligent. Time and again [the supreme 
court has] held that many factors may be considered in 
determining the degree of culpability with which an actor acted. 
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Bryan, 709 P.2d at 262. But "an intoxicated person is certainly not incapable of 
reckless conduct/' Id. Consequently, if intoxication did not prevent Defendant 
from perceiving the risk here, he is guilty of manslaughter. If, on the other 
hand, intoxication rendered him incapable of perceiving the risk, he is guilty 
only of negligent homicide. 
Here, the jury was instructed on intoxication and reasonably found that 
intoxication did not negate Defendant's perception of the risk (R68 & 85). See 
Boggess, 655 P.2d at 658 (recognizing that juries are uniquely qualified to make 
recklessness assessment given their collective everyday experience). 
Defendant never testified that intoxication prevented him from perceiving 
the risk he created. He claimed only that intoxication caused him to act stupidly 
(R178:141). When the prosecutor asked him where Loretta was when she said, 
"What are you doing with that" or "What are you going to do about it," 
Defendant responded that he was "drunk" and not "pay[ing] attention" to 
where Loretta was standing, but was looking down at the gun (R179:61). At the 
same time, he admitted that he knew she was in the bathroom and very near to 
where he was intentionally aiming the gun (Rl79:57-62). See State v. Pailla, 776 
P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989) (affirming murder conviction where intoxicated 
defendant claimed killing was accidental, not that he lacked ability to form 
intent). Moreover, the physical evidence established that Defendant knew 
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exactly where Loretta was — directly in front of him and standing near the 
bathroom door. See Statement of Facts at 9-10. See State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, < 
1349 (Utah App. 1991) (affirming manslaughter conviction where intoxicated 
defendant deliberately pointed gun at victim). 
In sum, as the jury reasonably found, Defendant's voluntary intoxication 
explained, but did not negate, his reckless actions. See State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 
1303,1306 (Utah App 1991) (" [e]ven if the defendant presents some competent 
contradictory evidence, we do not find facts anew/ ' ) . 
II. . 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN CHOOSING NOT TO 
OBJECT TO THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S TESTIMONY OR 
USE OF A STYROFORM HEAD 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for choosing not to . 
object to the medical examiner's testimony describing the victim's injuries or to 
the examiner's use of a Styrofoam head to aid in that testimony. See Br.Aplt at 
31-32. See also Add. D (photograph of Exh. 15: Styrofoam Head). 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
demonstrate both that 'counsel's performance was deficit, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,' and that 'counsel's 
deficient performance was prejudicial.'" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, % 11, 
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204 P.3d 880 (quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, | 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984))). 
Counsel, however, is strongly presumed to be competent and effective. 
Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, f 19, 165 P.3d 1195. To overcome this 
presumption, a defendant alleging ineffectiveness must affirmatively establish 
that "no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy77 justifies his attorney's actions. 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 1993). This showing may not be 
speculative, but must be "a demonstrable reality/7 Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
Even when the presumption of competency is overcome and deficient 
performance is established, the ineffectiveness analysis does not end. A 
defendant alleging ineffectiveness must also establish prejudice, that is, "a 
reasonable probability... that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different/7 State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A reasonable probability is one 
that undermines confidence in the verdict. Id. "In making this determination, 
an appellate court should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors, as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or 
have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record.77 
Id. "And as with the first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong 
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presumption' that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable/' 
Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, \ 23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699). 
Here, the merits of Defendant's ineffectiveness claim should not be 
considered, because he fails to marshal the evidence that supports the 
reasonableness of his counsel's actions and lack of unfair prejudice. 
Alternatively, the claim lacks merit. 
A. The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to 
marshal the evidence supporting his counsel's effectiveness. 
As discussed, supra at 21-22, appellate rule 24(a)(9) mandates that a 
defendant marshal all evidence that supports a fact-dependent ruling. But even 
when a claim of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, a defendant 
must still acknowledge all record facts that support the legitimacy of his trial 
counsel's actions. This duty is compelled not only by rule 24(a)(9), but is 
inherent in the Strickland standard itself. For although the ultimate 
determination of ineffectiveness is a legal question, resolution of its critical 
elements is factual. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. Consequently, marshaling 
is required. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f^ 38. 
Marshaling is also dictated by Strickland's presumption of competency. 
Just as the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to a verdict or 
ruling, see Clten, 2004 UT 82, Tj 78, Strickland requires that the facts be viewed in 
the light most favorable to counsel's actions. 
• - 3 4 -
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is 
all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has 
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission 
of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations omitted). Just as the regularity of a verdict 
or ruling is presumed when a record is inadequate or ambiguous, see Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,1150 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990), Strickland 
likewise mandates that inadequacies and ambiguities in the record be construed 
//7in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.'" State v. Walker, 2010 
UT App 157, f 13, 235 P.3d 766 (quoting LitJierland, 2000 UT 76, If 17). 
Consequently, when a defendant raises a claim of ineffectiveness — either in the 
trial court or for the first time on appeal —he must marshal all evidence, facts, 
and inferences that support his counsel's actions, before he may claim that there 
is no conceivable legitimate reason for those actions. 
Defendant contends that, in this case, "[i]t is inexplicable" why his trial 
counsel would not object to the medical examiner's testimony concerning the 
victim's injuries. See Br.Aplt. at 32. He fails to acknowledge, however, that a 
legitimate reason is evident in the record. Trial counsel wanted to ensure that 
no "gruesome" photographs of the injuries were admitted. See Statement of the 
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Case at 3-4. See also Add. C (Motion & Memorandum). To ensure this, counsel 
argued that there was no need to admit photographs of the injuries, because the 
medical examiner and others could provide the same information through their 
respective testimony. Id. On appeal, however, Defendant only minimally 
acknowledges that his counsel moved to exclude the photographs of the 
injuries, see Br.Aplt. at 32, but fails to disclose that the motion was successful, in 
part, because trial counsel chose not to object to the examiner's less graphic 
testimony. 
Additionally, Defendant assets that the medical examiner's testimony, 
including her use of the Styrofoam head, necessarily inflamed the jury to convict 
him. See Br.Aplt. at 32-33. But he does not acknowledge that the jury acquitted 
him of the most serious charge —murder. Nor does he acknowledge that 
another witness— the responding police officer — similarly testified to the 
victim's injuries and blood and tissue splattering that he saw at the scene 
(Rl78:120-128). On appeal, Defendant did not challenge the officer's testimony. 
In sum, Defendant's failure to marshal these significant facts justifies 
summary rejection of his claim. 
-36-
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B. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, Defendant fails to 
establish that his counsel's decision not to object was deficient or 
prejudicial. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, Defendant fails to establish that 
his trial counsel's failure to object was deficient or prejudicial. 
In essence, Defendant claims that the medical examiner's testimony and 
use of a Styrofoam head were objectionable because both were gruesome and 
inflammatory. See BrAplt. at 32. He also claims their admission was 
unnecessary because the cause of Loretta's death was not at issue. See id. at 30-
35. Defendant further claims his counsel could and should have moved to 
sanitize testimony by limiting it only to her conclusion regarding the positions 
of Defendant, the victim, and the gun when fired. See id. at 32. The claim lacks 
merit. 
Defendant was being tried for murder (Rl-3). Although he admitted that 
he shot Loretta, he contested the shooting was intentional (R178:58-64 & 186). 
Consequently, the prosecution had the right to fully present evidence that 
established Defendant's intent. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,137,106 P.3d 
734. This included not only the close range at which the shot was fired, but also 
the fact that the shot was fired directly at Loretta's mouth as she argued with 
Defendant. See R179: 119 (prosecutor arguing in closing that when Loretta 
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argued with Defendant and challenged him about "what he was going to do 
about it, he showed her, she'll never fight with him again"). t 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, see BrAplt at 32-34, an offer to stipulate t 
to a given fact does not deprive the prosecution of its right to present evidence 
of that fact: 
A stipulation of fact by defense counsel does not make evidence 
less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the prosecution the ' 
opportunity of profiting from the 'legitimate moral force' of its 
evidence in persuading a jury. 
Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, f 37 (in context of graphic photographs (citation and 
internal marks omitted). A "prosecutor may not be compelled to accept a 
stipulation as to an element of a crime" or accept a "colorless admission by the 
opponent . . . [s]o long as the defendant maintain[s] his" innocence. State v. 
Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Rather, "the State ha[s] 
the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever manner it chose[s], subject 
only to the rules of evidence and standards of fair play." Id. Accord State v. 
Stanley, 2011 UT App 54,113,676 Utah. Adv. Rep. 23 (citing Florez and rejecting 
argument that stipulation would have eliminated need for graphic 
photographs). 
Moreover, Utah authority does not support Defendant's assumption that 
graphic testimony is "gruesome" and, therefore, presumptively inadmissible. 
See State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, f 31, 246 P.3d 151 (recognizing that 
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"[n]either speculative claims nor counsel's failure to make futile objections 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel") (citation and internal marks 
omitted). Utah law recognizes only that gruesome photographs may be 
excluded when they lack unusual probative value and there are other less 
graphic means to present the same information. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1256-58 (Utah 1988) (establishing standards covering photographic 
evidence of deceased or injured victim). Here, trial counsel relied on this case 
law to successfully exclude all photographs of the victim's injuries, by arguing 
that any probative information derived from the photographs could "be 
established by other, less inflammatory, means," such as being "described by 
the testifying lay and expert witnesses." See Add. C (R46 citing Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
at 1257). 
Defendant's attempt to characterize Exhibit 15 — the Styrofoam head — as 
gruesome also lacks merit. See Br.Aplt. at 32-33. Such demonstrative exhibits 
fall outside of Lafferty's concern. Compare Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 (recognizing 
that colored, enlarged, photographs of injuries may be gruesome), with State v. 
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, | | 63-64, 206 P.3d 1223 (holding that "graphic and 
sobering" close-up photographs of victim's wounds depicting "a minimal 
amount of blood" were admissible and "far less shocking or inflammatory than 
the fact of [the victim]'s severe injuries"). Exhibit 15, on the other hand, has no 
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feature considered gruesome under Lafferty. It is simply a blue foam replica of a 
human head without any depiction of blood or significant detail, but for the < 
empty carved out spaces that show the dead-on explosive shot to the victim's 
mouth. See Add. D (photograph of Exhibit 15). The medical examiner used
 { 
Exhibit 15 not only to illustrate the victim's injuries, but also to explain the 
trajectory of the buckshot blast and how this established the proximity and 
positions of Defendant and the victim when the shot was fired (R178:177-184). 
The exhibit proved to be sufficiently useful that even defense counsel used it in 
cross-examining the medical examiner (Rl 78:183). 
In sum, Defendant fails to establish that his counsel was deficient in not 
objecting to the examiner's testimony or her use of the Styrofoam head. 
Nor has Defendant established prejudice, even if deficient performance 
were established. The medical examiner was not the only witness to describe 
the blood and tissue splattering that she observed when she went to the crime 
scene, or the victim's injuries that she observed both at the scene and later 
during her medical examination. The police officer that initially responded to 
the scene also described what he saw. Corn-pare R178:169-170, 174, & 177 
(medical examiner) with R178:123-27 (officer). Defendant does not challenge the 
admission of the officer's testimony on appeal. Consequently, regardless of 
sanitization of the medical examiner's testimony, the jury heard essentially the 
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same graphic details from the officer. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f ^ 6-8, 89 
P.3d 162; State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1,7-8 (Utah 1993) (both rejecting ineffectiveness 
claim where prejudice not established). 
Nor was this evidence unfairly inflammatory. See Br.Aplt. at 35. Here, the 
medical examiner's testimony and her use of the Styrofoamhead clearly did not 
provoke the jury to unfairly punish Defendant. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 8 
(recognizing that defendant asserting ineffectiveness must demonstrate that 
there is "a reasonable probability of a different outcome/' but for his counsel's 
deficient performance). The jury acquitted Defendant of the charged greater 
offense and convicted him of one of two lesser offenses that Defendant had 
requested. Defendant does not explain how sanitization of the medical 
examiner s testimony or exclusion of the Styrofoam head would have changed 
this result. Consequently, his ineffectiveness claim fails. 
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< 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's manslaughter conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted April 21, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
A I 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
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h Code Annotated § 76-2-103 (West Supp. 2010) Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
) : -lentionally, or with intent or \ villfully with resiv^t \? the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is hi- cor;s iou- objective or desire 
I» engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
:
~) 'Vtowingly, or with knowledge with respec " :- , ond.u. 
circumstances surrounding his conduct wlvn h( ;s anare ,-J th. nature or Fv:<-
conduct or the existing circumstances. . N ner- : i ;** i^ou ;nj ! 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his * *:de ' \ '-vn • - s awcrv U\-r ii^ 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
. -) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct c~ ^ c 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but conscif MISIV disregards a substa: .a! 
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result WL. occur > -u 
ri sk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a ^ n s ^ 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinarv person ^ere * '^ xe* :^^ > 
under all tih - -"jn'ssian/K ^ \ w*u ^  l i-.u^. ?ii.-. ^ri • f< *^ t n d ^ ' M i y 
( 4 j '..!;"; \ . II. .. IK , i
 sU_giigCPivC \M . •JlliP.Ul:- :-, ; ^ - g t J M wAl": -^>j_V< 
circumstances -urrounding his cone* Kt. or the R->aIt o\ his . ondu. \bk: 
ought to be aware oi a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cn\ a.nstan.es 
exist or the result will occur, The risk must be of a nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gre-- deviation n\)m me standard of care that 
an ordinan person e eu.J exercise n_ will the circumstances as viewed iron, me 
actor's standpoint. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-306 (West 2009) Voluntary Intoxication 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state i vhich is an element of the 
offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of 
an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary it itoxication, 
his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
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Ute )deAnn< ^ \.. •; « »st Supp. 2010 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if ;ne ,icu>r: 
(a) reckless i\ Lau^e- inc ^ .am J; „;}:ciiici\ 
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or 
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 
76-5-205.5. 
(2) 1\ lanslaugl ttei is a feloi i, y of tl le se- :oi id degree 
(3)(a) in addition to the penalty pro\ uieu unaer ims section or any other section, 
a person who is convicted of violating this section ^ha!! have the person's driver 
license revoked under Section ^-•- ^ 0 mC th^ cl« :!b " -^hrv p c ^ ^ -* ^ults 
from * | r * ^  * i ' * • * * n i • *f j *r ^ * * I " "*j"},t i 
(b) The court shall forward the report of the . on\ I ti< :\ resulting f?v:r; driving a 
motor vehicle to the Driver License Division in accordance with Seciion 53-3-218. 
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I JtaJ Code Annotate* I § 76 5-?Oh | ' - • 
(1 ) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent nonvude if the actor, acting w ith 
criminal negligence, causes the death of another 
'(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3)(a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other section, 
a person who is convicted of violating this section shall have the person's driver 
license revoked under Section 53-3-220 if the death of another person results 
trotr driving a motor vehicle. 
. j _u: court shall forward the report of the conviction tc • the Drii 'irer I icei lse 
Divisicn in accordance with Section 53-3-218. 
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Addendum B 
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I\STRL"r :''0N NO 7!> 
Before you can convict the defendant. Craig A. Veale. of the crime of Criminal 
Homicide, Mu;awi. LS cr.arc.a ;:; ; ouni; o: ::;L miurmaiion v, ;ne:. i.. a;^ J^U to na\ .• xen 
committed on or about December 28th, 2002, in Salt Lake Comity, Utah, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That the defendant, Craig A, \ eale, caused the death of Loretta Romero; and 
rhat the defendant: .; 
(a) did so either intentionally or knowingly; or 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the defendant committed 
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Loretta 
• • Romero; or ' : ' . ' . '• . 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, 
the defendant engaged in conduct which ci eated a grav e risk of dea th to 
another and thereby caused the death of Loretta Romero. 
If you are satisfied that all of the above elements have been proven beyond a reasonable 
• . • " " " I 11 , . 1 1 1 1 V. I : i I I \ i ' S ' i •:- i : ' : i i" i > \ i •.. i r-T A s i ; i"i ^ 7 " V "*. • !! ! V . \ » I I 
Information. Ii ihe evidence has failed to establish one or more of the elements listed above 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then y on must find the defendant not guilty of Count I. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. *? 
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense. 
/ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. f 
As an alternative to Murder,, tlic principal crime charged in tliis case, \ on 
may consider the lesser included offenses of Manslaughter and Negligent 
Homicide. The defendant can, however, be convicted of only one offense. You 
must, therefore, choose between the principal crime charged and the lesser 
included offenses. 
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\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. /O 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of manslaughter, a lesser 
included offense of murder, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. On or about December 28, 2002, in Salt Lake County; 
2. Craig Veale caused the death of another; 
3. While acting recklessly. 
In you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the 
other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements, then 
you should find the defendant not guilty. 
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. • INSTRUCTION NO. ^ i • ' 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of neg] igent homicide, a lessei 
included offense of murder, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all of the following elements of that crime: ' 
1 . .:..;; ...^ KC V. oimty, on or about December 28, 2002, the defendant, Craig Veale; 
2 \ cting with criminal negligence, ' • . ' ' • . 
3. Caused the death of another, 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the essential elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
2-:i.. . :-:c- ^:\L-j\.^\j.Aj,:>. : J:-,^-:. ..,.;;.- or more r- i ;»...: JI ^ ments, then you ^; J 
find the defendant not guilty. ' . ' . . 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / Z 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, a person engages in conduct "Recklessly" 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[ Jnder the law s c f the State of I Itah, apei son engages in conduct \ vith "Criminal 
Negligence" w ith respect to circi in istances si irroi inding h is condi ict or the resu It c f his 
conduct when he ought to be awrare of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a na'ture and degree 
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
an 01 dinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as ^ riewed from the actors-
standpoint. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
ROBLN xv. LJUNGBERG, #6056 _.:.•__ 7ILED 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 03 Mi I 3 ' PH12: 3 ! 
424 East 500 South, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 "' 
Telephone: 532-5444 IY. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MO riON IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
GRUESOME PHOTOGRA PHS 
CRAIG VEALE, 
Defendant. 
Case No. lC.^i345o rS 
JUDGE ANTHONY QULNN 
•,. •.-..-; \ rALE, through his counsel of record, and moves this 
Court '" * ••: the introduction of photographs of the decedent's wounds 
on the grounds that they are gruesome in nature and likely to inflame the jury; that the 
information can be described by the testifying lay and expert witnesses, and ;h, t. ''? 
relevant, the evidence violates Rule 4u3, Utah Rules of Evidence, in that any probative 
value is outweighed by the prejudice to the Defendant. See, State v. Vargas, 20 P.3d 271 
(Utah 2001): State v. Decorso. 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999); State v. Lafferty. 749 P.23 
1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud. 722 P.23 750 (Utah 1986); State v. Dibello, 780 P.23 
1221 (Utah 1989). 
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DATED this the / ? day of June, 2003. 
ROBTN^rr^GBERG 
Attorney for>Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District Attorney, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, day of June, 2003. 
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ROBIN'K. LJUNGBERG, #6056 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKH DEPARTMENT 
1Kb :ii \i. O- -.-. : ' >RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
:\;ui'i«.)N IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
r.Di "ccnifc cuoTnr.D \ D U C 
• " .• • . P l a i n t i f f , '• • :. • . 
v. : 
CRAIG VEALE, " : . Case No. 021913456 FS 
JUDGE ANTHONY QUINN ' 
Defendant. : 
•' Conies now CP A IG V EAI £, tlinuiuh his counsel M% >ecord nil respctlUilly 
submits this Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion In Limine To Suppress 
Gruesome Photographs. 
• : . " . SUMMARY OF : \ RGl JMEN T . 
I he admission into evidence of certain photographs taken of the deceased woi ild 
violate Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because they are gruesome and 
3 
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inflammatory in nature. Tuo prosecution cannot meet its burden ui establishing the 
unusual probative value of the photos because the information can be adduced by other 
means, and because none of the information contained in the photos is in dispute. 
The Photographs Are Gruesome, And Thus Require A Showing of Unusual 
Probative Value Under Rule 403. 
The photographs that the prosecution intends to admit into evidence includes a 
number of color photos of a shot gun wound to a young woman's face. The photos are 
horrifying, and literally show that the deceased's face was blown off by the blast. 
In State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that gruesome photographs of a corpse in a homicide case require "a showing 
of unusual probative value before it is admissible under rule 403." Id. at 1256; citing 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986). In Lafferty. the photos showed the homicide 
victims' bodies and wounds, and carried a strong emotional impact, while conveying little 
information beyond the fact that the victims died violent and bloody deaths. Id. at 1257. 
The Court noted that an important consideration in assessing the probative value 
of a photograph is whether the facts shown by the photograph can be established by 
other, less inflammatory, means. Other factors to consider are: whether the photos are 
color; when they were taken; whether they are close-ups or enlargements; their degree of 
gruesomeness; the cumulative nature of the evidence, and whether facts shown are 
disputed by the defendant. State v. Laffertv. at 1257; [citations omitted]. 
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing the unusually probative nature of 
the photos. Id. at 1256; State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989). In the 
present case, the prosecutor cannot show that the photos are unusually probative. 
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First, an or me mioiuiation winch could conceivably be aauuced from the photos 
LdJi !»e established h\ uncontradicted la) ,md mi'djcal te:-liri]un\. Secondly, none c: ;^e 
information contained in the pholos is disputed hy die defendant in this casi; "] bus the 
sole purpose of this evidence is to "inflame and arouse the jury." State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 
113,1 17,441P.2d51 2,515(1968). ' 
. _ cONCL USION " • • 
The admission into evidence of these photographs w oiiki vn »Iate Rule -JO'3 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence because they are gruesome and inflammatory m nature. The 
prosecution cannot meet its burden of establishing the unusual probative value of the 
phv
 t .*> because J ^ .i.^rmdiior can lu UUJUL£J L\ <jdier means, and because none of the 
* i *••': .i:;-. ix . •: :> i . : ., -^ * . ,•.. !':erci . .• - c:vaant moves this 
Court to suppress the photographs. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of June, 2003. 
RUBIN K. LJjAOBERG 
Attorney for ^ Defendant 
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Addendum D 
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